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Abstract
Foreign policy rhetoric as a campaign strategy is limited in the current literature. The
U.S.’ polarized political climate has divided voters along domestic issues. Therefore, foreign
policy may be one of the few remaining “common ground” issues upon which U.S. presidential
candidates can secure a broad, national coalition across the political spectrum. Pulling from Joe
Biden’s speeches during his 2020 presidential campaign from C-SPAN’s coverage, I analyze his
rhetoric in relation to China in a possible attempt to appeal to 2016 blue-collar Trump supporters.
My results reflect Biden’s use of four major frames in his China foreign policy rhetoric relating
to economic competition, Donald Trump’s “secret” bank account in China, COVID-19, and the
perceived loss of American prestige on the international stage. By studying President Joe Biden’s
2020 appeal to Trump supporters via a rhetorical framing of China, this thesis explores a new
potential theoretical breakthrough, ripe for scholarly investigation: presidential candidates may
be turning to foreign policy to gain voters from their opponent’s base, thus securing a bipartisan
coalition.

Keywords: China, Joe Biden, rhetoric, campaign, foreign policy
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Introduction
The 2016 U.S. presidential election was an epitomized example of the power of
candidates’ rhetoric. We witnessed a single candidate’s discourse framing sway voters from both
mainstream parties (i.e., the Democratic and Republican parties) to support him. In 2016, Donald
Trump framed his campaign rhetoric as an appeal to return to traditional American values, where
the blue-collar American would be prioritized. Trump took advantage of the discontent many
working class Democrats felt toward the Obama years and the economic hardships his
Recession-era economic policies wrought upon them. In line with Trump’s appeal to return to
traditional American values, Trump’s rhetoric regarding the U.S.-Mexico border and isolationist
economic policy proposals were particularly appealing to voters from both sides of the political
party spectrum.1 Seeing this example, and apprehensive of the Hillary Clinton campaign’s
overconfident strategy in key swing states, the 2020 Biden campaign may have taken a careful
approach with regards to Biden’s rhetoric. A notable inclusion in Biden’s rhetoric was China.
While the existing literature regarding sitting presidents’ use of foreign policy to establish a
favorable national agenda is vast, the literature regarding U.S. presidential candidates’ use of
foreign policy rhetoric to sway voters is lacking in comparison. The literature that does exist
often discusses candidates doing so to appeal to their own political base. For example, in the
presidential election of 1992, Bill Clinton utilized foreign policy rhetoric to criticize incumbent
President George H.W. Bush’s humanitarian track record and further affirm the Democratic vote.
When the literature does discuss candidates utilizing foreign policy rhetoric to appeal to voters
from the opposing party, the scapegoat burden is almost entirely focused on the incumbent’s
incompetence, rather than the foreign entity. For example, in the election of 1980, candidate

1

Dias, Elizabeth, et al. “Voices from Democratic Counties Where Trump Won Big.” TIME.Com,
https://time.com/voices-from-democratic-counties-where-trump-won-big/.
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Ronald Reagan aimed to sway Farm Belt Democrats by criticizing incumbent President Jimmy
Carter’s grain embargo on the Soviet Union. Reagan effectively shifted the responsibility of the
foreign policy threat to the incumbent rather than the present foreign entity. The existing
literature contends that candidates utilize foreign policy rhetoric, specifically rhetoric
emphasizing the alleged threat posed by foreign entities, to posit themselves as strong leaders
and to emphasize the incompetence of their opponent as commander-in-chief.
However, I explore my theory that presidential candidates may also agenda set specific
foreign policy issues to peel off members of the opponent’s electoral coalition. I arrived at my
theory from my observations of Biden’s speech rhetoric and the intense political polarization the
U.S. electorate has consistently experienced within the past decade.2 The 2016 presidential
election in particular exposed the recent polarization trend. The new polarization was evident in
very fundamental domestic issues (e.g., the economy, abortion, the U.S.-Mexico border, climate
change, racism, LGBTQ+ issues, etc.), which has further exacerbated in light of recent major
events, such as the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests and the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover,
because Hillary Clinton’s loss has been partly attributed to Democrats defecting to vote for
Trump, Biden could not afford to ignore Trump supporters as potential voters. In order to win,
Biden would have to form a coalition among 2016 Trump supporters. I specifically refer to these
voters as 2016 Trump supporters because many 2016 Trump supporters were long-time
Democrats before they defected to vote for Trump. It’s reasonable to assume that Biden would
want these voters back. I argue that the Biden campaign recognized that an effective strategy to
form a voting bloc within this group, without alienating more liberal Democrats, would require
the use of foreign policy as a selling point. However, foreign policy also has the potential to be a
2

“The Shift in the American Public’s Political Values.” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy, 20 Oct. 2017,
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/interactives/political-polarization-1994-2017/.
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polarizing topic (e.g., the war in Afghanistan and immigration). With the appropriate rhetorical
framework though, I argue that the Biden campaign may have recognized that China can pose a
“threat” that appeals to ideals on both sides of the U.S. political spectrum. For Democrats, China
can be seen as a threat to democracy, human rights, and civil liberties. For Trump supporters,
particularly the blue-collar and working-class, China and its cheap labor is a threat to their
economic prosperity. I noted that Biden’s rhetoric shifted to emphasize matters that would
concern blue-collar workers. In this manner, I arrived at my hypothesis that Biden may have
deliberately discussed China as a foreign threat to appeal to the blue-collar workers Hillary lost
in 2016. My hypothesis thus may point to a broader emerging pattern, which has not been
discussed in the existing literature. Candidates may deliberately agenda set foreign policy issues
to appeal to the opposing party’s voters in order to secure election victories in a new polarized
political climate that leaves little room for bipartisan agreement on domestic issues.
My hypothesis contrasts with the literature’s assertion that candidates agenda set foreign
policy issues to affirm their own political base and, once they have received the nomination, to
appeal to the general national American electorate. Again, I specifically hypothesize that in
2020, Biden used China rhetorical frames to peel off 2016 Trump supporters in key swing states
because he could not sacrifice framing his domestic policies in a manner that would appeal to
Trump supporters without alienating Democrats. Examples of swing states where he may have
used a foreign policy rhetoric that emphasized China include Pennsylvania, Michigan, and
Wisconsin.3 He may have done so by emphasizing a narrative of economic competition, jobs, and
international prestige, while simultaneously avoiding frames that would typically appeal to
Democrats in solidly blue states. If this is true, I expect to see Biden use particular discourse
frames about China that emphasize manufacturing, jobs, and beating China in emerging
3

I argue he may have also done so in other states such as Florida, Iowa, Ohio, and Arizona, however less frequently.
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industries when speaking to conservatives in swing states, which are not frames that Democrats
are necessarily interested in. Moreover, I expect Biden to deemphasize frames surrounding China
that would appeal to Democrats (e.g., human rights violations and climate change) when he has a
reasonable level of expectation that Trump supporting audiences are in attendance. This would
contrast with what the existing literature would lead us to expect. The existing literature would
lead us to expect that Biden would (1) craft his China foreign policy rhetoric to appeal to
Democrats (e.g., China’s human rights abuses, negative climate change contributions, etc.), (2)
craft his rhetoric to appeal to the broader American audience, and/or (3) mainly craft his rhetoric
to emphasize Donald Trump’s incompetence in the face of the threat of China.
In my results and analysis section, I discuss my findings and the strategy I can discern
from Biden’s rhetorical patterns on China. I find that Biden discussed China in approximately
33% of his campaign events in swing states and that his rhetoric could have been presumed to be
aimed at blue-collar workers in industries that have been directly and negatively affected by
trade policies with China. I was able to presume this from both the locations where Biden made
his speeches and the text analysis that I conducted. Biden mainly mentioned China in locations
where manufacturing had historically been a main source of employment for the working-class.
Manufacturing in the U.S. has experienced a significant decline in the face of competing,
cheaper Chinese manufacturing.4 Within the text of his speeches, Biden consistently explicitly
called out to unions and the working class, effectively positioning them as the targets for his
speeches.5 While Democrats have historically appealed to working-class voters in the
4

From 2001 (when China entered the World Trade Organization) to 2013, 2.4 million U.S. manufacturing jobs were
displaced. Manufacturing jobs made up 75.7% of the jobs that U.S. trade with China displaced.
Kimball, Will, and Robert E. Scott. “China Trade, Outsourcing and Jobs: Growing U.S. Trade Deficit with China
Cost 3.2 Million Jobs between 2001 and 2013, with Job Losses in Every State.” Economic Policy Institute,
11 Dec. 2014, https://www.epi.org/publication/china-trade-outsourcing-and-jobs/.
5
In almost all of his speeches, Biden delivered some version of the following blurb: “The middle class built this
country… and unions built the middle-class.”
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manufacturing industry, for decades it has been an appeal to simply reaffirm a loyal voter base.
In 2016, however, it is precisely this group that the Hillary Clinton campaign may have taken for
granted, allowing Trump to appeal to them instead. Consequently, in 2016, this once confirmed
Democratic voter base became a swing voter base as they chose Trump, now leading Democratic
candidates to scramble and refocus their appealing efforts to re-convince working-class Rust Belt
voters to return to the Democratic Party. However, due to the increasingly polarized political
climate surrounding domestic issues, my hypothesis explores the theory that foreign policy has
become the most strategic platform to attract conservative blue-collar workers. Thus, Biden may
have turned to utilize China, framed into very particular themes.
Biden used four main discourse themes surrounding China. The main underlying
sub-theme among the four frames Biden employed is a narrative of Trump as a white-collar elite
who holds stronger loyalties to China than to normal Americans, particularly the blue-collar
workers that voted for him. In the first theme, Biden implicitly claimed traditional blue-collar
manufacturing industries are in decline because of both China’s “abuses” and, more importantly,
Trump’s deliberate facilitation of those abuses. According to Biden, Trump’s loyalty is further
underlined by his willingness to pay China taxes and not the U.S. government, as well as his
trade wars and policies that are harmful to blue-collar workers. This argument is reflected in the
second theme where Biden repeatedly mentioned a “secret” bank account that Trump has in
China. In the third frame, Biden discussed COVID-19 in a manner that once again highlighted
Trump’s incompetence and friendliness toward China. He claimed that Trump knew about the
seriousness of COVID-19 in January 2020 but delayed his response to the virus and instead
praised President Xi Jinping. This third frame especially contradicts the existing literature’s
arguments (i.e., foreign policy rhetoric is meant to retain a politician’s existing base) as the frame
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is one that would turn off Democrats. It holds racial implications about China’s connection to
COVID-19 that is more in line with a Republican’s rhetoric. Finally, in the fourth frame, Biden
claimed that despite the greatness of the U.S. military, U.S. international prestige has declined
thanks to Trump. The opinion that the U.S. must remain the most powerful country on the
international stage is also a notion that is more salient among Republicans (or conservatives)
than among Democrats. Ultimately, Biden potentially used these frames to discredit the
“outsider” framing Trump posited for himself in 2016, and to establish himself (Biden) as an
underdog from a blue-collar town who knows what it’s like to be looked down upon by the
wealthy. From my analysis, we can begin to see an emerging strategy driving the utilization of
foreign policy discourse in presidential campaigns as a tool to form a bipartisan coalition within
a polarized electorate that has an increasingly narrow list of domestic issues both sides of the
spectrum can agree on.

Literature Review
While vast amounts of literature exist regarding sitting presidents’ utilization of foreign
policy rhetoric to deliberately establish a favorable national agenda, relatively minimal literature
has been produced regarding a similar strategy in presidential candidates’ rhetoric. My thesis is
exploring the argument that presidential candidates also strategically use such rhetoric to craft a
supportive coalition, thus increasing their successful electoral prospects. The literature that has
been produced thus far regarding this phenomenon seemingly falls into four main arguments
discussing how and why presidential candidates shape their foreign policy rhetoric. The first
camp argues that candidates deliberately highlight foreign issues in their speeches to highlight
the incumbent’s “fecklessness” and promote their own qualifications as commander-in-chief,
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rather than to present any tangible foreign policy proposals. The second school of thought claims
that Democrats in particular use foreign policy to take on a hawkish persona, since Democrats
are arguably considered to be relatively dovish (and therefore “weak” compared to Republicans).
The third argument in the present literature argues that, once having received the nomination,
presidential candidates utilize foreign policy to establish broad, national support. According to
this argument, foreign policy is not necessarily targeted toward a specific voting group. The
fourth camp contends that candidates deliberately position U.S. international prestige to be in
threat, which the incumbent cannot successfully protect. This is considered to be a “framed
threat,” deliberately promoted by presidential candidates via foreign policy rhetoric to evoke fear
and anxiety among voters, in the hopes that voters will choose the candidate at the ballot box.
China has particularly become a common target for politicians to weaponize as a foreign threat
as Americans deal with the negative employment effects of globalization.
Exploring more in depth, the first major argument that scholars have raised has been that
presidential candidates purposely use foreign policy to discredit the incumbent president’s ability
to properly lead the nation on the international stage. According to Michael Armacost,
candidates deliberately highlight foreign issues, framing them in an urgent light, to both
emphasize the “fecklessness” of the incumbent and boost their qualifications as “plausible
commander in chief.”6 For example, in Ronald Reagan’s campaign for the presidential election
of 1980, he hoped to attract the Farm Belt demography by criticizing the grain embargo that
President Jimmy Carter had imposed on the Soviet Union as a response for their invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. In the campaign for the presidential election of 1992, Bill Clinton criticized
President George H.W. Bush’s refusal to admit Haitian refugees and promised that his presidency

6

Armacost, Michael H. Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections, pp.
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would grant greater leniency and asylum.7 Interestingly, the Ronald Reagan example may reflect
the closest similarities to what I argue was Biden’s strategy in 2020. Reagan produced rhetoric
that emphasized a foreign threat in a potential attempt to attract supporters who may have
otherwise voted Democrat.8 Thus in 1980 a concern from the Reagan campaign was that the
Farm Belt had the potential to be a swing vote but would continue to vote Democrat unless he
tailored a very specific aspect of his foreign policy rhetoric, which was especially salient only to
them.
On the other hand, Bill Clinton shaped his foreign policy rhetoric simply as a means to
further affirm his appeal to members of his own political party, i.e., Democrats. Clinton posed
the threat of the Haitian migrant crisis, but framed it to criticize President George H.W. Bush’s
lack of humanitarian spirit. While this makes sense for Clinton because he was appealing to
members of his own party, who more than likely would not have appreciated a scapegoating of
the Haitian refugees, Reagan’s rhetoric (presented above) makes less sense under the present
literature’s existing arguments. Reagan’s foreign threat rhetoric could have easily included the
threat of the Cold War and the Soviet Union to stoke fear and anxiety, thus mobilizing potential
Democratic voters to choose him. Instead, he shifted the responsibility to President Jimmy
Carter’s embargo. The Clinton example perfectly supports the existing literature’s arguments: a
candidate will craft a foreign policy rhetoric to further reaffirm their existing base. The Reagan
example, however, displays an additional goal that has not been sufficiently discussed by the
present literature. Candidates may use foreign policy rhetoric to target groups beyond those
identified by the present literature (i.e., the candidate’s own party and/or the national audience).
7

Ibid., 107.
In the previous presidential election, in 1976, a few states from the Farm Belt (specifically Minnesota, Wisconsin,
and Missouri) voted Democrat.
“Historical Presidential Election Map Timeline - 270toWin.” 270toWin.Com,
https://www.270towin.com/historical-presidential-elections/timeline/. Accessed 4 Apr. 2022.
8
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Foreign policy rhetoric, which is a discourse tactic that has the potential to aggregate groups with
differing domestic political inclinations (proven by its common use to appeal to a national
audience), may also be specifically crafted to appeal to an opponent’s voting base. This is the
unspoken strategy that I hypothesize the Biden campaign identified and employed in 2020 to
gain Trump voters.
In “No Love for Doves? Foreign Policy and Candidate Appeal,” John Kane and Helmut
Norpoth study the manner in which Democratic candidates position themselves in their foreign
policy rhetoric, compared to Republican candidates. In my own analysis of Biden’s rhetoric, their
argument rings partly true. Kane and Norpoth analyze that previous literature has argued that
Democratic candidates must present a more hawkish stance in foreign policy in order to
effectively counteract a perceived Republican advantage. Hawks in international relations tend to
be hard-liners, less likely to make concessions, and more willing to respond with force,
compared to doves who are more likely to be cooperative.9 Consequently, dovish practices can be
perceived as relatively “weak,” which is often considered a disadvantage for Democratic
candidates when placed in comparison to traditionally hawkish Republican candidates who have
a reputation of being “tough” or “strong.”10 This particular argument is supported by previous
literature which argues that citizens generally prefer “strong” leaders in the realm of foreign
policy, during both war and peace times.11 This phenomenon was visible in the Democratic
primaries for the presidential election of 2008. During the primaries, Hillary Clinton consistently
placed herself to the political left of Barack Obama for almost every domestic issue; however,

9

Clare, Joe. “Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 58, no. 7,
Sage Publications, Inc., 2014, pp. 1311–37, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24545624.
10
Kane, John V., and Helmut Norpoth. “No Love for Doves? Foreign Policy and Candidate Appeal.” Social Science
Quarterly, v. 98, n. 5. https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/ssqu.12377,
pp. 1660.
11
Ibid.
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she positioned herself to his right on foreign policy.12 It is evident in the existing literature that
the manner in which Democratic candidates craft their foreign policy rhetoric tends to be a
response to the perceived success or shortcomings of Republican candidates’ rhetoric.
Kane and Norpoth’s response tactic argument supports my theory that the Biden
campaign formed its foreign policy strategy to counteract Trump’s electoral success in 2016
among the blue-collar, working class. Moreover, in my analysis of Biden’s rhetoric, his stance on
China seems to support the argument that Democratic candidates posit themselves to be equally
hawkish, if not more hawkish than their Republican opponent. However, this phenomenon
specifically occurs in Biden’s China rhetoric. In other foreign policy issues, Biden returns to the
traditionally cooperative and “dovish” rhetoric style. For example, his campaign website states,
“... President Biden will organize and host a global Summit for Democracy to renew the spirit
and shared purpose of the nations of the Free World.”13 This contradicts Kane and Norpoth’s
argument, which would lead us to expect Biden to maintain a hawkish stance across the board.
Rather, Biden’s selective decisions of when to posit as a hawk point to a different strategy, where
his tough rhetoric on China is a targeted attempt to out-hawk Trump in the eyes of Trump
supporters that care deeply about China. Furthermore, similar to Armacost, the focus of Kane
and Norpoth’s argument also rests on the manner in which candidates frame their foreign policy
rhetoric to appeal to the members of their own political party. There is no attention paid to a
more complex strategy: whether candidates shape their foreign policy rhetoric to appeal to voters
of the opposing party. In terms of domestic issues, regardless of the status of the polarized
political atmosphere, common topics tend to be divisive (i.e., the economy, abortion, etc.).
Foreign issues, however, can promote unity under the umbrella of shared nationality on the
12
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international stage and boost a national leader’s popularity.14 In this manner, candidates can
hypothetically attract members of the opposing party who would otherwise vote for their usual
political party’s candidate. Thus, Kane and Norpoth’s argument explains why Democratic
candidates sometimes take on uncharacteristic hawkish foreign policy stances, but does not
explain why Democratic candidates seemingly do so with very specific audiences and not across
the board.
In The Rhetoric of Heroic Expectations: Establishing the Obama Presidency, Jennifer
Mercieca and Justin Vaughn do touch upon the concept of crafting rhetoric that would satisfy
two sides of a political spectrum as they analyze Barack Obama’s rhetoric concerning foreign
policy.15 However, in their analysis, the two audiences that Obama perceived needed satisfying
were the domestic and global audiences. Mercieca and Vaughn consider the domestic audience as
one cohesive audience, without much deliberation on whether there could be differences in
political opinion regarding foreign affairs. While their argument does support my hypothesis that
foreign policy is an issue that can be successfully used to form a broad, national foundation of
support for a candidate, their argument too quickly disregards the nuances within the domestic
audience, which must be catered to by the candidate if they are to build cleavages of support. I
hypothesize that the Biden campaign identified China as an issue upon which they could
construct political support from both sides of the U.S.’ domestic political spectrum. However,
unlike Mercieca and Vaughn’s assumption that the domestic audience would easily agree with a
single version of a candidate’s rhetoric, I believe Biden’s campaign understood that the manner
in which they framed China needed to differ depending on the particular audience. On one side,
14

Kazun, A. D. "“Rally Around the Flag” Effect. How and Why Support of the Authorities Grows During
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we see the recurring Democrat spiel: China is a repressor of human rights, a large emitter of
carbon, and a reason why democratic nations must fortify their alliance.16 On the other side,
when the target audience is present, China is stealing jobs, responsible for COVID-19, and trying
to beat us at the new employment market in electric energy – a rhetoric more aligned with
Republican values.
Another common theme in presidential candidates’ rhetoric is the concept of American
international prestige. Candidates frame their foreign rhetoric to establish the United States in a
position of imminent or occurring downfall on the international stage. This was present during
John F. Kennedy’s campaign where he complained that American prestige was in decline. Unlike
the previous Reagan and Clinton examples, he did not craft his rhetoric to significantly criticize
the incumbent and his policies. Rather, he promised to further escalate President Dwight
Eisenhower’s containment policies to protect the U.S.’ prestige. 17 A similar strategy was utilized
in the election of 1980 by Ronald Reagan, where he claimed that the incumbent, President
Jimmy Carter, had allowed American prestige to decline. 18 Reagan’s rhetoric, coupled with the
ongoing global developments (e.g., the hostage crisis in Iran), most likely led Jimmy Carter to
reshape his own rhetoric in response to the increased sense of low American prestige abroad
among voters.19 Moreover, in the Kennedy example, Kennedy complained that a “missile gap”
was forming between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he would close.20 In this
manner, Kennedy signaled the existence of a military threat, which would hypothetically create

16
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feelings of fear or anxiety, effectively mobilizing voters to choose him as president. Biden seems
to follow this tradition in his own rhetoric. He argues that although the U.S. continues to have the
“most powerful military,” respect and trust in the U.S. and its presidency is in sharp decline as a
result of Donald Trump’s inadequacy in the face of China’s threat.
Candidates deliberately frame threats in such a way to evoke mobilizing emotions (e.g.,
fear, anxiety, anger, etc.) that will serve to benefit the candidate at the ballot. The idea of a
“framed threat” is one that Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner discuss in Anxious Politics:
Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World. According to them, a “framed threat” is defined
as a “Debted cause of harms (not necessarily physical), where harms can be delayed.” In
contrast, an “unframed threat” is defined as a “Widely agreed upon cause of harm. Harms may
include imminent bodily harm and/or death.”21 Arousing anxiety in particular is a common
campaign strategy.22 Of course, there can exist a present and tangible “unframed threat” that
would rationally lead to anxiety among the public (e.g., a pandemic, terrorist attack, economic
downturns, etc.).23 When tangible events that evoke feelings of imminent death or destruction are
not present, candidates utilize their rhetoric to produce “framed threats,” effectively urging the
public to focus on looming threats to evoke anxiety and feelings of efficacy, which can translate
to the ballot box (i.e., if the public votes for the correct candidate, this threat will be resolved).24
In terms of a foreign policy, a “framed threat” could be a rising power like China. However,
Albertson and Kushner’s analysis implies that candidates maintain the same inflammatory
rhetoric for every audience, regardless of potential differing priorities. This lack of further
elaboration is probably due to the common assumption that candidates mainly craft their rhetoric
21
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to appeal to their own base, rather than attempt to extract a cleavage from within the opposing
party. Or, it could be due to the assumption, similar to Mercieca and Vaughn, that the domestic
audience is a cohesive one with similar interests.
This assumption is also clear in James Paterson’s “The Politics of Protection: America
and Australia Compared.” Paterson notes the increased prominence of protectionist and
isolationist sentiments against foreign powers in election rhetoric. He observes that the use of
such rhetoric in presidential campaigns is a strategy to rally an electorate among an American
populace that is increasingly fearful of foreign economic threats, particularly China.25 In his
analysis however, he views Americans’ increased fear of foreign actors as an independent factor
that influences candidates’ rhetoric instead of the reverse. Moreover, he further removes
responsibility from candidates by arguing that the current rhetorical environment is a product of
the U.S. electoral system. He argues that using rhetoric that scapegoats foreign powers is a
consequence of the U.S.’ primaries structure, where popular opinion selects the presidential
nominee as opposed to a political party (which is common in other countries).26 However, my
thesis shows that such rhetoric is present even after the primaries, once a candidate has secured
their party’s nomination. Furthermore, while he acknowledges that candidates utilize their
rhetoric to agenda set, his argument only covers candidates’ attempts to win over members of
their own political party to receive the party nomination. In other words, crafting such rhetoric is
not necessarily done to gain supporters from the general electorate, much less members from the
opposing party. It is instead only done in order to win the nomination. Once they have achieved
this and are a presidential candidate, Paterson argues that the contender’s rhetoric becomes less
“extreme” and more moderate to appeal to a broader audience, and not completely alienate
25
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voters in the opposing party.27 My thesis explores the possibility that the opposite can be true,
which potentially occurred during Joe Biden’s presidential campaign in 2020. I hypothesize that
Biden’s rhetoric became more extreme and targeted after his nomination, when his focus shifted
to peeling off blue-collar Trump supporters. The theoretical implications would suggest that
foreign policy rhetoric may be less a result of the nomination process. Rather, the audience
throughout the election process and the prominence of political polarization has a greater
influence on candidates’ rhetoric.
In conclusion, the arguments I discussed above collectively have three main underlying
themes regarding U.S. candidates’ use of foreign policy rhetoric during their campaign. The first
main theme is that candidates mainly focus on reaffirming their own political base. Democrats in
particular use foreign policy rhetoric to strategically take on a hawkish stance in an effort to
mitigate a perceived Republican advantage in foreign policy. Second, foreign policy rhetoric is
employed to form a broad, national coalition. However, it assumes that the domestic audience
has a cohesive opinion regarding foreign policy and that the same version of a candidate’s
rhetoric will work with every domestic audience. Third, foreign policy rhetoric is used to cause
anxiety among the electorate with “framed threats.” Again, this theory assumes that the “threat”
is framed the same with every audience. The literature falls short in explaining why candidates
may opt to utilize different versions of foreign policy rhetoric with different audiences within the
domestic electorate. Moreover, it falls short in explaining why Biden would use language about
China that is more aligned with Trump supporters’ stance when speaking to them, but use
Democratic-aligned language in different political environments. My thesis seeks to explore
these gaps in the literature by arguing that the Biden campaign’s China rhetoric points to a
separate, increasingly relevant strategy, where candidates find that foreign policy rhetoric is one
27
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of the few remaining tools they can still use successfully in a polarized electorate to form a
bipartisan coalition. Of course, this remaining tool must be adjusted accordingly to the particular
audience the candidate is speaking to.

Data and Methods Section
My hypothesis is that in 2020, Joe Biden utilized China in his campaign rhetoric to peel
off blue-collar Trump supporters, particularly in key swing states, by emphasizing specific
dialogues that appeal to them, simultaneously avoiding rhetorical frames that appeal largely to
Democrats in solidly blue states. In order to adequately explore my hypothesis, I analyzed
Biden’s campaign rhetoric when there was a reasonable expectation that blue-collar Trump
supporters would be in the audience. My hypothesis is that when Biden had a reasonable
expectation that working-class, blue-collar Trump supporters would be present in the audience,
he used China discourse frames that emphasized competition, particularly the need to “beat”
China at emerging industries (e.g., clean energy, new technologies, etc.). If this is true, I expect
Biden to have used such frames when he was campaigning in key swing states; for example,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin. A corollary hypothesis consistent with
the first is that even when he is discussing issues that usually appeal to Democrats, like climate
change, he will not use frames that appeal to Democrats (e.g., the environmental and
humanitarian ramifications of climate change) and instead use frames that appeal to blue-collar
audiences (e.g., job creation, conservation of American prestige abroad, etc.).
The data I collected for this thesis primarily came from C-SPAN’s coverage of the 2020
Biden presidential campaign from September 3, 2020 until November 3, 2020, the day of the
election. I specifically focused on speeches that Biden delivered in states that were highly
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contested and/or voted for Donald Trump in 2016; for example, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida
to name a few. It’s reasonable to assume that these speech events would be more likely to have
2016 Trump supporters (and 2016 Democrat defectors) in the crowd.28 My reasoning for that is
that Biden would not have needed to utilize foreign policy in his rhetoric in a state that was
reliably blue, based on its 2016 electoral record. I further discern between certain events within
those states by not including in my data events that are clearly targeted toward typically blue
groups (i.e., LGBTQIA+ voters, Latinx voters, African-American voters, etc.).
In addition, my time frame does not start earlier because Joe Biden did not receive the
Democratic Party presidential nomination until mid-August.29 Therefore, I do not expect him to
have focused his campaign efforts or rhetoric to appeal to Republican voters until September
because he would previously have been engaged in appealing to Democrats to secure the
nomination among a large pool of contenders. This is reflected in C-SPAN’s coverage during the
latter half of August as Biden continued to campaign in blue states like Delaware. I utilize
C-SPAN’s coverage as my data because I found C-SPAN to have the most extensive reserve of
Biden’s raw campaigning rhetoric, without journalistic commentary. In addition, C-SPAN
included the locations of Joe Biden’s speaking events, which makes it relatively more
methodologically justifiable for me to attach a potential audience (i.e., conservatives or Trump
supporters). Moreover, C-SPAN has coverage of different aspects of Biden’s campaign including
general campaign events, rallies, round tables with voters, interactions with reporters, “get out
the vote” events, and more. In addition, C-SPAN covered not just Biden’s individual
campaigning. It covered Kamala Harris, Dr. Jill Biden, and celebrity endorsers’ campaigning as
28
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well. However, I did not look at his campaign’s rhetoric in all of these settings. I will not include
analysis for moments when the campaign talks to reporters or journalists. For example, C-SPAN
has coverage of when notable campaign members land in swing states and immediately begin to
answer reporters’ questions. I will not include this because I do not believe these are moments
when the campaign would reasonably expect Trump voters to be in the audience. They are not
interacting with voters directly.
Furthermore, I will not include all campaign events in key swing states because although
their location is in a key swing state, many events are more clearly tailored to particular groups
that tend to be solidly Democrat. For example, the Biden campaign hosted a “Souls to Polls''
voter mobilization event on November 1, 2020 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.30 The event
featured mainly black, Christian community leaders. I contend that it is reasonable to treat this
particular event as a campaign appeal to black voters (particularly black Christian voters) where
Trump supporters were less likely to be present.31 A similar instance can be found in a campaign
rally with Lady Gaga in Pittsburgh.32 Lady Gaga is a prominent community member and
advocate for LGBTQIA+ rights, and would most likely not be featured if the target audience was
conservative, Rust Belt Trump supporters.33 Therefore, I do not expect the Biden campaign to
have utilized rhetorical frames to appeal to Trump supporters in these kinds of events.
Moreover, I will focus only on Joe Biden’s individual campaign rhetoric and not analyze
his surrogate campaigners, particularly notable individuals such as Barack Obama, Kamala
Harris, and Dr. Jill Biden. Obama is a controversial figure to the blue-collar Rust Belt voters that
30
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Biden would be trying to attract if he indeed was trying to carve out a cleavage in the opposing
party.34 Thus, I do not believe that his individual presence and rhetoric would have been targeted
toward presumed Trump supporters in the audience.35 Furthermore, I will not analyze Kamala
Harris’ rhetoric because her presentation (i.e., a woman of color) could have a turn off effect on
the blue-collar rural white voters Biden would need to attract in key swing states. This argument
is reasonable when we take into account their attitude toward Hillary Clinton in 2016. Trump’s
rhetoric was particularly powerful in framing Hillary as “lying Hillary” to these voters. The
Biden campaign may have thus expected Joe Biden’s classic all-American, white, and male
presentation to be more tolerable in these states; therefore, making his individual rhetoric of
particular interest in utilizing China to appeal to Trump supporters.
Thus, in gathering my data, my methodology was very simple. Within the parameters that
I established previously (mentioned above), I individually collected the raw transcripts from
every campaign event where I believe Joe Biden would have reasonably attempted to craft his
rhetoric to include China in an effort to appeal to Trump supporters. With the parameters in
place, I was ultimately left with thirty-three speaking events to collect data about and analyze. I
analyzed the transcripts and determined the frequency at which he employed a frame about
China in his rhetoric. I did so by first noting his explicit mention of the terms “China,”
“Chinese,” and “Xi Jinping.” I inferred that speeches in which he would use those terms would
feature his campaign’s crafted rhetoric. Within those speeches, I subsequently categorized the
topics he discussed into themed frames.
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Methodological Limitations
Of course, there is room for methodological limitations with the manner in which I
collected this data. First, the manner in which many of the transcripts were presented in the
C-SPAN closed captioning section were not automatically and cohesively collected into a single
script. They were often broken up into multiple sections. Furthermore, many of the transcripts
were not corrected. Because I am a single individual, constrained by the volume and timeline
allowed for this project, I am not able to go through every transcript and correct every single
syntax error that C-SPAN’s closed captioning algorithm may have committed. When Biden
mentioned China, I corrected those sections of the transcript; however, for the most part, I left
the transcripts untouched. The message he is delivering is still very decipherable; however, some
of my analysis may be impacted by syntax errors within the transcripts I reviewed. While the
transcripts did have syntax errors, the errors were mainly due to Biden’s natural cadence or
slurring of words due to his regional accent. For example, when he meant to say “me,” the
algorithm picked it up as “may.” When he meant to say “as,” the algorithm picked it up as “us.”
Despite these minor syntax errors, C-SPAN’s closed captioning algorithm was able to pick up
main keywords, including “China,” “Chinese,” and “Xi Jinping.”
In addition, there was a speaking event Biden completed where the audio quality was
somewhat poor. This consequently affected the transcript. In many instances within that event,
the transcript has certain gaps where there is no text for the content of Biden’s speeches.
However, because the audio is poor and not understandable, it is difficult for me to produce my
own transcript for the content. Based on the nature of this event, however, the probability that
Biden would mention China is low. Specifically, on October 29, 2020, Joe Biden visited
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Florida.36 I watched this particular video and am able to note that he did not mention China. But,
the actual text does not adequately capture the first half of his speech. Thus, the first half of the
transcript for this event is essentially missing. Because I watched the video, I know that Joe
Biden did not mention China here because he was primarily focused on rousing a Latinx voting
coalition. He explicitly mentions the diverse Latinx community in the state and immigration
issues (in addition to his usual rhetoric about COVID-19, taxes, and employment, which he
mentions in some variation at almost every event). Due to the length of the event and his speech,
I was unable to produce my own transcript. However, because I have an extensive amount of
content where I was able to collect a complete transcript, I do not believe that this particular
shortcoming will have a significant impact on my analysis.

Using County Margins of Victory
Although I look primarily at Biden’s rhetoric in swing states, the state-level information
alone is not enough to discern whether Trump supporters would be present in the audience of
each campaign event. A state could have barely voted for Hillary over Trump or vice versa, but
the voting distribution within particular in-state areas could differ from the state-level
distribution. In addition, I do not have access to reliable individual data for 2016 Trump
supporters in particular areas. Thus, data at the county-level, specifically county margins of
victory (MOV), is a better proxy for assigning a likelihood that Trump supporters would be
present in an audience. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the Biden campaign has
completed an analysis on what each location’s population’s preferences are based on information
similar to the county-level data I utilize. Based on this information, the Biden campaign likely
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designed their campaigning strategy to focus on utilizing China discourse frames in places where
they could expect a larger number of voters that could be peeled away from voting for Trump.
Furthermore, with the county-level data, I can more reasonably find a pattern and/or potential
strategy for Biden’s usage of particular China frames in his rhetoric.

Results and Analysis
From the transcript data I analyzed, Biden mentioned China in his rhetoric in eleven out
of the thirty-three speeches (33%) I reviewed in key swing states. When Biden included China in
his rhetoric, there were four major themes he employed: China and Trump’s economic abuses on
the blue-collar American worker, Trump’s “secret” bank accounts in China, COVID-19, and the
alleged decline in American international prestige. Based on the specific frames Biden used to
craft his rhetoric regarding these four themes, the possibility that Biden was specifically looking
to peel off working class, blue-collar Americans who are directly affected by economic policies
toward China and/or are employed in declining industries (e.g., manufacturing) is highlighted.
This especially includes union workers (whom Joe Biden explicitly refers to in almost every
speech), large numbers of which voted for Trump in 2016.37 The Biden campaign may have
targeted this group because there is a reasonable level of expectation that they already hold
animosity toward China. In addition to further exacerbating that animosity by scapegoating
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China, Biden also frames Trump as having a positive relationship with China. Within his China
rhetoric, Biden crafts a narrative where Trump has higher loyalties to China than to the American
blue-collar, working class. In turn, Biden frames himself as an underdog “regular Joe,” from a
blue-collar town who attended a state university – the antithesis to the corporate elite Trump. In
this manner, Biden can shift the target group’s attention away from Biden’s relatively globalized
economic policies.
It is important to precede my qualitative discourse analysis by first discussing the pattern
I found in Joe Biden’s usage of China rhetoric. This pattern may be reflective of a greater
strategy the Biden campaign may have utilized in its effort to gain the voters in key swing states
that Hillary Clinton lost in 2016. I found that Biden’s decision to use a particular theme in his
China rhetoric corresponded with a certain range in that county’s 2016 margin of victory (MOV).
The pattern can more easily be viewed in the following chart.38

Audience’s 2016 MOV

Actual Issues/Themes Used
by Biden

Expected Issues/Themes to
Be Used by Biden

1. Counties where Hillary
mostly won with a relatively
large MOV:
● Toledo, OH; MOV =
17.3
● Cleveland, OH; MOV
= 35
● Milwaukee, WI;
MOV = 37.4
A county where Trump won
by a slight MOV in his favor:
● Des Moines, IA;
MOV = 7

Economic Competition:
● Trump’s trade policies
harmed blue-collar
workers.
● Job insecurity
blue-collar workers
are currently facing
are allegedly caused
by China “stealing”
jobs.
● The U.S. needs to beat
China to the new
green economy.

Overall, the actual
issues/themes used in these
locations and MOVs align
with my expectations.
Additionally, since the MOVs
show a relatively larger
quantity of Hillary voters, I
also expected an emphasis on
international prestige. For
example:
● China is moving in to
take over the U.S.’
international allies and
the U.S.’
“international
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goodwill” position,
exacerbated by
Trump’s foreign
policy incompetence.
2. Biden mostly used the
secret bank account
issue/theme in his home state
of Pennsylvania, where he
could more clearly juxtapose
himself (framed as part of the
local working class) against
Trump’s elite background.
Counties where Hillary won:
● Bucks County, PA;
MOV = 0.6
● Flint, MI; MOV = 9.5
● Pittsburgh, PA; MOV
= 16.4
County where Trump won:
● Luzerne, PA; MOV =
19.6

3. Counties where Hillary
won, but still had a somewhat
middling MOV. If he chose to
use the COVID-19 frame in a
county that significantly
swung for Trump in 2016, it’s
reasonable to assume they
wouldn’t care about
COVID-19. If he chose to use
this frame that

Trump’s Secret Bank Account I expected rhetoric focused on
in China:
economic competition. For
example:
● Trump pays more
taxes in China than he
● China has caused the
does in the U.S. In
loss of traditional
other words, Trump is
American jobs.
economically disloyal
● The need to beat
to the U.S.
China at the new
green economy and
● Trump is an elite (in
turn, Biden is a
technology, with an
“regular Joe”).
emphasis on the
creation of jobs that it
will bring back. I
expected this
rebranding of Biden’s
comparatively greener
environmental policy
since Pennsylvania is
home to a lot of
fracking.
The frame of the secret bank
account was a surprise;
however, it makes sense as
Biden tries to legitimize his
Pennsylvania roots by
emphasizing Trump’s
outsider elite status and lack
of “American loyalty”
through a China frame.
COVID-19
● Racially tinged
rhetoric about the
pandemic.
● China & Trump knew
about the virus, but
Trump did nothing
about it.
● Trump praised
President Xi Jinping

The Pittsburgh, PA location
had two frames: the
COVID-19 frame and the
secret bank account frame
(referenced above).
Based on how close Chester,
PA’s MOV is to the rest of
Pittsburgh, PA and that it is
still in Pennsylvania, I
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overwhelmingly voted for
Hillary Clinton, the racially
tinged rhetoric would
presumably not have been as
effective.

for his response to the
virus in its initial
stages.

additionally expected a
continuation of the secret
bank account frame.

Counties where Hillary won:
● Pittsburgh, PA; MOV
= 16.4
● Chester, PA; MOV =
22
4. Counties where Trump
won and where the other
themes would not have been
effective, including a county
that overwhelmingly voted
for Trump in comparison to
the other counties I studied.
● Phoenix, AZ; MOV =
3.4
● Johnstown, PA; MOV
= 37.7

Loss of American
International Prestige
● Trump and his
presidency have
caused a downfall in
the U.S.’ international
prestige.
● More people trust and
respect the leader of
China.

I was surprised that he
mentioned China in Phoenix,
Arizona at all. I did not
expect Biden to include China
in his rhetoric here as
Phoenix, AZ is not part of the
Rust Belt. Its working-class
job sector has not been
affected by China in the same
way as the other locations
included in my analysis.
Indeed, upon review of my
data, this is the only time he
mentions China in Arizona
and it is early in his campaign
as a confirmed nominee,
reflecting perhaps a
recognition that rhetoric
about China is not most
effective in this location with
this particular MOV.
In Johnstown, PA, I expected
Biden to continue signaling at
his Pennsylvania roots and
emphasizing China in an
economic frame. Moreover, I
would have expected him to
continue using the secret bank
account frame in order to
show that Trump is aligned
and friendly with a country
that is “an enemy” to
traditional American values.
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Within 2016 swing states, the Biden campaign also strategically selected swing counties
in which to utilize China in Biden’s speech rhetoric. This is evident in the range of the margins
of victory (MOV) in the counties where Biden discussed China. With the exception of three data
points (Johnstown, Cleveland, and Milwaukee), the Biden campaign avoided counties where
either Trump or Hillary had an overwhelming majority. The Biden campaign may have
understood how futile it would be to try to peel off voters in deep “Trump country” with only a
discourse strategy. In addition, the Biden campaign may have understood the risk of using a
discourse that was relatively conservative leaning (i.e., the danger of China) in very liberal
counties that are not necessarily directly affected by U.S. policies toward China. Thus, upon
review of the MOVs within the counties where Biden employed China to peel off voters, it
points to the possibility that the Biden campaign selected counties that leaned slightly toward
Hillary Clinton during the 2016 election, but were conservative enough that Biden could expect
Trump supporters to be in the audience.
More specifically, the margin of victory within the swing counties also potentially played
a role in determining which specific theme the Biden campaign would utilize in Biden’s
speeches. For the first theme, economic competition, it seems that the Biden campaign possibly
selected locations that leaned more toward Hillary in 2016 (relative to the other themes’ data
range). At first glance, the range in the MOVs for this theme may not seem consistent. For
example, this theme shows MOVs that are contentious in Trump’s favor (-7), middling in
Hillary’s favor (17.3), and large in Hillary’s favor (35 and 37.4). However, upon further
consideration, the specific cities he selected all have a commonality: they are home to industries
that have been directly, negatively impacted by globalization and China. These cities are
collectively home to agricultural and traditional manufacturing industries (e.g., automobile
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manufacturing). This also means that they are home to blue-collar workers, potentially in unions,
who may have sided with Trump in 2016 despite their long history of voting Democrat. Indeed,
Trump was able to win states with strong unions in 2016, sparking concerns among Democrats
about election prospects for 2020 in these areas.39
The second theme, Trump’s secret bank accounts in China, saw the Biden campaign
targeting Pennsylvania areas where the MOV was extremely contentious (0.6 in Hillary’s favor)
to middling in either direction. I will argue later in this thesis that this particular theme was
employed by the Biden campaign as a way to establish Biden as a “regular Joe” from a
blue-collar town and frame Trump as an economically disloyal corporate elite. (For example, in
Luzerne, PA on 10/24/2020, Biden discusses Trump’s secret bank account and follows it by
declaring, “He thinks Wall Street built this country, but you and I know who really built this
country. Families like mine, working people built the middle class and unions built the middle
class.” By saying this, Biden criticizes Trump’s alleged economic elitism and positions himself
as someone who represents the working middle class.40) By utilizing this particular frame in his
home state, in counties whose MOVs were relatively center in 2016 and where he can call upon
more specific Pennsylvania blue-collar symbols (e.g., his Pennsylvania childhood, calling his
grandfather “grandpop,” and mentioning Scranton), Biden could more effectively peel off
sympathetic blue-collar 2016 Trump supporters. This frame may not have been as effective in
locations like Wisconsin or Ohio where Biden cannot as successfully signal hometown
reminiscent symbols to frame himself as a “regular Joe” in comparison to Trump.
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The third theme is COVID-19. Biden includes rhetoric regarding COVID-19, specifically
in relation to China, only twice. The frame within this theme is an accusation of Trump for the
COVID-19 pandemic’s impact in the U.S., claiming that he knew beforehand how dangerous the
virus was when it was still mainly in China, but instead he praised China.41 The implicit meaning
Biden attempts to promote in this frame is that Trump was in league with China to keep the
danger of COVID-19 hidden. Both instances of this theme occur in places where the county’s
MOV was middling in Hillary’s favor. I contend that Biden deliberately selected locations with
these statistics because he understood the particular political risks of this theme. Discussing
COVID-19 in a frame meant to appeal to Trump supporters in places that more clearly favored
Trump would be futile or potentially alienating considering the controversiality of COVID-19
among those groups. At the other end, discussing COVID-19 in a conservative frame connecting
it to China would alienate more liberal voters who would probably not appreciate its racist
implications.
Finally, the fourth theme – the loss of American international prestige – was used by
Biden in locations that favored Trump with MOVs at two different extremities: contentious (3.4)
and large (37.7). Johnstown, which holds the larger MOV (37.7) from 2016, is in Pennsylvania.
However, Biden could not have effectively used the rhetorical strategy here that he used for the
secret bank account or COVID-19 frame. Johnstown’s 2016 MOV is simply too large in Trump’s
favor for Biden to reasonably expect that he could peel off Trump supporters with talk about his
humble childhood in Pennsylvania or by utilizing COVID-19 in a China frame to discredit
Trump’s personal loyalties and competence. However, because conservative voters tend to be
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more concerned with maintaining U.S. superiority abroad, the Biden campaign may have used
this theme in order to mobilize any potentially malleable 2016 Trump supporters.42 The same
argument could potentially hold true in Phoenix, Arizona: 1) the industries in this area are not
likely to receive significant direct impact from economic policies toward China, 2) Biden would
not be able to use his hometown signaling here, and 3) Phoenix is too conservative (voting for
Trump in 2016 with a 3.4 MOV) to use the COVID-19 frame without significant risk. Thus, if
using a foreign policy rhetorical frame to peel off Trump supporters, the Biden campaign’s best
bet may have been to focus on the decline of U.S. prestige abroad.
It is important to note that there do exist potential deviations in the speeches I analyzed
where the patterns I have found cannot be applied. In an ideal campaign, the perfect candidate
will follow their campaign advisors’ and speech writers’ suggestions exactly. However, the
reality is that candidates may speak “off the cuff” or forget to include particular talking points. In
addition, I do not have enough quantitative evidence to prove my hypothesis. With the data I
have been able to access, I can only present broad patterns that potentially point to a strategy the
Biden campaign may have used.

Economic Competition
Moving on to the analysis of each theme Biden promoted, the first rhetorical frame I will
analyze is economic competition. Specifically, this particular theme included the perception that
the U.S. is losing (or in danger of losing) on the international stage because of China’s “abuses”
and Trump’s facilitation of those abuses. While Biden discussed economic competition in four
out of eleven (36%) of his China-including speeches, he explicitly mentioned China’s alleged
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abuses three times, mainly in the context of trade and American companies sending jobs
overseas. He mentioned it twice in Ohio: Cleveland and Toledo.43 In addition, he mentioned it
once in Des Moines, Iowa.44 In Des Moines, Iowa, for example, Biden claimed, “And let’s not
forget how Donald Trump’s weak and chaotic China trade policy has cost farmers and
manufacturing so badly… I’ll do what he’s been unable to do. I’ll mobilize the true international
effort to stop China’s abuses so we can strengthen manufacturing and farming in Iowa and across
the country.”45 This quote perfectly encapsulates the two main themes in Biden’s economic
scapegoat of China: trade (often specifically referring to the decline in American exports) and
outsourcing jobs overseas.
In Cleveland, Biden discussed the failure of Trump’s trade policies with China. He cited a
statistic which calculates that agricultural exports to China during the Trump years have been
40% lower than during Obama’s second term. (He used the same statistic in Des Moines, Iowa.)
In addition, he discussed foreign bankruptcies, general exports, and companies shipping jobs
overseas. While these issues are not necessarily linked to China specifically (e.g., companies
often ship jobs to Latin America and other Asian countries), Biden framed it as a China issue. He
explicitly promised, “My policy is gonna hold China accountable.” The agricultural industry
workforce, many of them blue-collar workers, is directly affected by trade policies with China
and, thus, has an apprehensive attitude toward China. The Biden campaign recognized this
sentiment and effectively scapegoated China in an effort to affirm blue-collar workers’ economic
concerns and place himself “on the same side.”
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In addition, Biden similarly addressed the automobile industry with essentially the same
frame. The Biden campaign recognized the decline in the automobile industry and political
stances it has fostered among that particular section of blue-collar workers. The Democratic
Party, including Biden, arguably represent the perceived causes for the industry’s decline:
globalization, new technology, and a call for economic policies that prioritize the fight against
climate change. All of these concepts negatively affect traditional blue-collar occupations,
including automobile manufacturing. Therefore, the emergence of the electric vehicle industry is
bound to create anxiety regarding job security and, thus, create a disincentive to vote for a
candidate that is in support of fighting climate change by shifting to electric and renewable
energy. Biden most likely understood this employment insecurity dilemma, which has probably
been further exacerbated by the unemployment rate spike caused by the pandemic.46
Biden steered the audience’s attention away from conceptualizing their increasing job
insecurity as a matter of Democrat climate change policies and a rising emphasis on new
technology (especially electric). (In a poll from November 2016, 49% of Trump voters said that
transitioning from fossil fuels toward clean energy will reduce economic growth and cost jobs,
compared to 29% who said that such a transition would improve economic growth and provide
new jobs.47) Instead, he pushed the audience to conceptualize it as China trying to beat us at
reaching new technology and its accompanying market (i.e., new jobs). He declared, “Folks, if
we don’t act, China is gonna own the market. China is gonna own it all and we will act.”48 In this
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manner, Biden additionally shapes his rhetoric to foster a sense of competitiveness among the
audience that would hopefully lead to feelings of efficacy, which would then translate to the
ballot. He pursued this goal in Toledo, OH as well by saying, “I promise you I will stand up to
China’s trade abuses. I will invest in the American worker because I know no one, nobody [can]
compete [with] an American worker when [Americans have] gotten a fair shot… I will step up
and I will expand capacity so the United States, not China, leads the world in modern new
technology.”49
Thus, Biden possibly attempted to mitigate blue-collar workers’ opposition to voting for
a liberal candidate by deliberately turning to Trump’s foreign policy and China as the causes for
their economic insecurity. In addition, his rhetoric simultaneously moved away from the need to
stop climate change as the motivator for shifting to renewable energy in the automobile industry.
By framing it into a competition with China to dominate the emerging market and once again
make the U.S. the capital of automobile manufacturing, Biden thus concurrently placed Trump as
an incompetent commander in chief, deemphasized his own climate change policy proposals
(which would inevitably negatively impact traditional manufacturing industries), and attempted
to rouse a competitive spirit in manufacturing workers to “defeat” China, hopefully effectively
mobilizing them to vote for him over Trump.
Connecting Biden’s rhetoric to the existing literature, Biden’s economic competition
rhetoric does partly align with previous arguments. The first argument Biden’s rhetoric
somewhat aligns with is the argument presented by Albertson and Kushner in Anxious Politics:
Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World. According to their argument, candidates
deliberately frame threats in a particular manner that rouses feelings of anxiety while also
49
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promoting a sense of efficacy, which can translate to the ballot box. Biden does rouse feelings of
anxiety by claiming that China will take over the new electric technology and the job market that
comes with it. According to Biden’s anxiety-tinged rhetoric, China will be the new world leader
of technological innovation if individuals do not vote for him. However, unlike the argument
Albertson and Kushner present, which contends that candidates deliberately foster anxiety
among voters in order to mobilize them, Biden may be simply taking advantage of an anxiety
that already exists. Like I mentioned earlier, blue-collar workers in areas marked by industry
decline and increasing job insecurity already understandably face anxiety regarding their
economic situation and prospects. Thus, rather than foster a new sense of anxiety, Biden simply
magnified an already existing anxiety and crafted it toward his favor.
The second argument Biden’s rhetoric aligns with is the argument that presidential
candidates, particularly Democratic candidates, craft their rhetoric to position themselves as
hardliners and posit their opponent as “weak.”50 However, the previous literature has mainly had
a focus on candidates doing this within a military context and have focused less on this tactic
being used in an economic context as is the case in Biden’s 2020 campaign rhetoric. The third
argument that the previous literature claims is that presidential candidates attempt to discredit the
incumbent’s competence as a commander in chief.51 Biden did attempt that in Des Moines by
saying, “I’ll do what [Trump’s] unable to do. I’ll mobilize the true international effort to stop
China’s abuses so we can strengthen manufacturing and farming in Iowa and across the country.
I’m gonna hold China accountable, which he hasn’t.”
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However, Biden’s rhetoric within this theme also extends beyond the existing literature
with regards to the latter two arguments. While scapegoating China, Biden simultaneously
pushed the implicit argument that Trump is in league with China. For example, in Toledo, Ohio,
Biden specifically discussed companies sending jobs overseas and his plan to incentivize
companies to bring those jobs back through taxes.52 He placed Trump as a target for blame due to
his trade war with China, “We will end Trump’s new incentive for sending jobs abroad and that
is what he has done… We will make a trade to fight for every American worker… not Trump’s
trade war, erratic tweets and bluster…” While at first glance this would support the existing
literatures’ argument that presidential candidates scapegoat the incumbent’s incompetence as
commander in chief in order to frame themselves as hardliners, Biden still goes a step further.53 It
is important to note that Biden also claimed that Trump deliberately incentivized jobs being sent
abroad with his policies. Thus, Biden simultaneously pushed forth two narratives. The first
narrative: the traditional one of an incompetent, weak incumbent (which the existing literature
commonly contends). The second narrative: Trump is deliberately undermining the success of
the blue-collar worker.

Donald Trump’s Secret Bank Account in China
The second theme Biden commonly used in his China rhetoric was Trump’s “secret”
bank account in China. He repeatedly highlighted that Donald Trump has paid more taxes in
China than he has in the United States.54 Biden mentioned Trump’s so-called secret bank account
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in China in four of the eleven speeches (approximately 36%) where he included China in his
rhetoric. The general line Biden typically used was, Trump “has a secret bank account in China.
He paid fifty times more taxes in Beijing than he has paid in the United States.”55 The existing
literature argues that presidential candidates weaponize foreign policy issues in an effort to
discredit the incumbent as a competent commander-in-chief.56 However, the manner in which
Biden discredits Trump with this particular frame has less to do with presidential competency. It
has more to do with his personal character and loyalties. Throughout his campaign and
presidency Trump repeatedly portrayed himself as “tough on China.” However, by emphasizing
Trump’s Chinese bank account and tax record, Biden presented to blue-collar voters a version of
Trump that is conniving and economically disloyal to the United States.
Biden’s objective with this particular rhetorical frame may have been to position Trump
as an elite, which is starkly different to how Trump framed himself during his 2016 presidential
campaign (i.e., an outsider who wanted to “drain the swamp”).57 To further highlight Trump as
an elite, Biden usually accompanied the bank account theme in his China rhetoric with a blurb
about how he grew up with “guys like Trump.” By this he means individuals who were rich, who
had “inherited everything they have ever gotten,” and looked down on blue-collar people like
Biden.58 He further framed himself as a non-elite in comparison to Trump by citing that if he
were to win, he would be the first president in a long time who had not attended an Ivy League
university. Thus, by including this anecdotal information with the rhetoric regarding Trump’s
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account and taxes in China, Biden effectively frames Trump as someone who looks down on the
working class, evades contributing his share like a Wall Street elite (an additional imagery Biden
commonly employed), and who owes a higher level of loyalty to China. In this manner, Biden
possibly utilized this particular China frame to plant a seed of doubt among blue-collar Trump
supporters in the audience as to which side Trump is on personally and, by extension, politically.
This differs from the existing literature, which does not consider the possibility that presidential
candidates may use foreign policy to also discredit an incumbent’s personal character.

COVID-19
The third major theme present in Biden’s rhetoric of China is COVID-19. He places
China in a COVID-19 frame twice: once in Chester, PA (on 10/26/2020) and in Pittsburgh, PA
(on 11/02/2020).59 In Chester, he specifically discussed Trump’s poor and delayed response to
COVID in China at the beginning of the outbreak, “We had 34 people in China. And to the best
of our knowledge, he never asked them to go to Wuhan to figure out… how bad the situation
was.” He emphasizes the same discourse again in Pittsburgh, “The president, he knew in January
how bad this virus was. In January. He knew it… he got intelligence briefings laying out how
dangerous it was coming from China and where it was happening. And he said no, he didn’t read
his intelligence.” Furthermore, in Chester, Biden again frames Trump as being not only weak,
but friendly toward China, “And remember, he was praising the president of China, President
Xi.” Again, Biden strategically discussed China in a particular frame that would allow him to
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target Trump’s personal loyalties because Biden possibly understood it would be difficult to peel
off Trump supporters if he approached them with talk about policies.
Furthermore, the Biden campaign may have understood this particular frame had the
potential to be detrimental if used with the incorrect audience. These two campaign events were
the only instances in my data where Biden included COVID-19 in his China rhetoric. (Biden did
discuss COVID-19 repeatedly in other instances where he does not mention China mainly in a
frame akin to wartime rhetoric.) Both campaign events were in areas where Hillary had a
middling to large lead in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.60 I contend that Biden did not
mention China, especially in the context of COVID-19, in counties where Trump had a major
margin of victory. Regarding the China-COVID frame, COVID-19 is an alienating issue among
Trump supporters. Discussing it in a frame that would appeal to Democrats (i.e., masking,
vaccine rates, health risks, etc.) would have potentially turned off any Trump supporters that
Biden was trying to sway his way via a China discourse. On the other hand, Biden also did not
mention China in relation to COVID-19 in places where Hillary had a relatively large margin of
victory. For example, he did not mention it in Cleveland, Ohio on 11/02/2020, despite the fact
that he did include China in his rhetoric with different framing at that same event. He also did not
use a China-COVID rhetoric in Cleveland, even though he utilized the China-COVID framing
the same day in Pittsburgh (mentioned earlier in this section).
Biden possibly did not utilize the China-COVID frame in counties where Hillary had a
major margin of victory because Biden had a reasonable level of expectation that the audience at
those campaign events would be more left-leaning on the political spectrum. Discussing
COVID-19 in connection to China would most likely not have boded well among more liberal
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voters, due to the layer of racism such rhetoric implies. Indeed, the Biden campaign had come
under fire earlier in the year for utilizing similar rhetoric in a campaign ad.61 Thus, the Biden
campaign potentially deliberately selected swing counties that had voted for Hillary in 2016 with
a middling to large margin of victory, which would allow him to discuss COVID-19 within a
China frame to sway any Trump supporters, without alienating more liberal voters who were
likely to be less tolerant of such racially charged rhetoric.

Loss of American International Prestige
The fourth theme Biden incorporated into his China rhetoric is the alleged loss of the
U.S.’ prestige abroad. This usage of foreign policy rhetoric is partly in line with Armacost’s
argument that presidential candidates employ the concept of declining American prestige abroad
to mobilize voters.62 For example, in his speech on October 8, 2020 in Phoenix, Arizona, Biden
precedes his explicit mention of China by discussing the U.S.’ military strength. 63 He declared,
“We have the most powerful military in the history of the world.” Subsequently, though, Biden
lamented that despite the U.S.’ great military strength, respect for the U.S. on the international
stage is in decline. He continued, “Seventeen major countries in the world [were asked] what
leaders they admire and trust the most. Do you know what they say? More people trusted the
leader of China and Putin of Russia than the president of the United States.” Similarly, in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania on 09/30/2020, Biden said, “Donald Trump is less respected than
President Xi and Putin.”64 By specifying that the specific target for this lack of respect is the
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presidency, Biden signaled to the audience that Trump was the reason for the loss in the U.S.’
prestige.
(Furthermore, in Pittsburgh, PA on November 2, 2020, he emphasized the U.S.’ social
status abroad again and its deficit in comparison with the U.S.’ international military superiority.
While Biden did not explicitly name “China,” Biden claimed that no one can match the U.S., not
even “Asia.”65 I contend that it is reasonable to assume Biden implicitly meant China. He
subsequently continued to specifically blame Trump for this downfall by saying, “We’re a
laughingstock around the world right now. The only thing that can tear America apart is America
itself. And that’s exactly what Donald Trump has been doing since the beginning of his
campaign.” Because Biden did not explicitly name China, I did not add this to my chart as an
instance where Biden includes China in his rhetoric. Nevertheless, I believe this particular
speech merited further review because of the China-adjacent frame Biden used regarding U.S.
international prestige.)
The manner in which Biden specifically included American international prestige in his
China rhetoric, however, differs from the argument that Armacost presents. In the examples
Armacost’s arguments offer, the presidential candidates cite specific foreign policies that the
incumbent took on that supposedly caused American international prestige to decline. For
example, then-candidate John F. Kennedy complained that President Dwight Eisenhower's
containment policies needed to be escalated to protest the U.S.’ prestige. Biden, on the other
hand, maintained the focus on Trump himself and his presidency, rather than Trump’s specific
foreign policies. Similar to the implicit purpose in using the economic competition and secret
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bank account themes, in this theme Biden was possibly also attempting to plant doubt among
Trump supporters regarding Trump’s personal competence and loyalties as president.

Conclusion
In conclusion, while I could not quantitatively prove my hypothesis (which states that
Biden deliberately framed China as a threat in his rhetoric to appeal to the blue-collar workers
that Trump won in 2016), I believe my thesis sheds light on a potential pattern that has emerged
in presidential candidates’ rhetoric in recent years. It is widely recognized in U.S. political and
electoral research that the American political spectrum has grown increasingly polarized in the
past decade. Thus, split-ticket voting may become less frequent, forcing (presidential) candidates
to find new avenues via which they can attract voters outside of their party’s stronghold to ensure
an electoral victory. I argue that, in a political climate where most domestic issues have now
become a hot button topic, candidates have turned to foreign policy to establish a common
“enemy” with which they can rally a base among voters that would otherwise vote for the
candidate’s opponent. While including foreign policy in campaign rhetoric is not a new
phenomenon, the manner in which Biden included it differs from what the existing literature
covers.
By analyzing the specific frames Biden attached to his China rhetoric and the specific
audience that he presented his rhetoric to, my research highlights the gaps in the existing
literature about presidential candidates’ use of foreign policy. Much of the literature I reviewed
in my thesis focused on presidential candidates using foreign policy in their rhetoric to affirm
their own existing political bases (e.g., Armacost and Paterson). There is a lack of research
studying how foreign policy rhetoric is used to cater to voters specifically from outside of the
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candidate’s usual political base, while simultaneously and deliberately de-emphasizing the usual
foreign policy rhetorical frames candidates will utilize when the audience mainly consists of
their confirmed voter base. On the other hand, when the literature does include voters outside of
the candidate’s political base into its argument (e.g., Kane and Norpoth, Mercieca and Vaughn,
and Albertson and Kushner), it conceptualizes those voters as part of a broad, national audience,
rather than an independent entity. Or, if the election has an incumbent, the candidate’s foreign
policy rhetoric places the incumbent’s incompetence as the main scapegoat to be blamed. The
literature does not consider that candidates may be crafting a foreign policy rhetoric specifically
for an audience outside of their political base, a rhetoric that would not appeal to the typical voter
from their base or to the broad national audience.
The 2016 U.S. presidential election exposed the widening chasm in political beliefs
between the two mainstream American political parties. In addition, it exposed the dangers of
taking certain groups (i.e., blue-collar workers, particularly in the Rust Belt) for granted, leaving
them disgruntled and receptive to the opponent to swoop in to self-posit as the candidate who
will listen to their needs. Therefore, with the aforementioned two developments exposed in the
2016 election, subsequent candidates like Biden may have recognized that finding a common
ground may be limited to emphasizing foreign policy and finding a “common enemy” or
scapegoat there. Moreover, when including Trump in his foreign policy rhetoric, instead of solely
focusing on Trump’s incompetence (as the current literature would lead one to believe), Biden
frames Trump in an ally-adjacent position to the “common enemy”: China. The argument that
candidates will frame incumbents as being in league with the foreign scapegoat is also notably
absent from the current literature, perhaps because it is a recent development. My thesis
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hopefully reveals the gaps in the present research and highlights the above implications for future
study.
Scholars who are pursuing this line of inquiry should investigate presidential candidates’
foreign policy rhetoric and how the frames they utilize may differ based on the audiences they
are speaking to. The sources for data to pursue this research will probably come from the
transcripts of presidential candidates’ speeches when they speak to audiences in swing states.
Moreover, researchers will have to study voting patterns that run deeper than MOVs to be able to
plausibly categorize the audience present at the candidate’s campaign event. Researchers should
also study how candidates frame other foreign policy issues, apart from China. Finally, there may
also be value in studying how a candidate’s rhetoric on the foreign policy issue differs once they
are elected and have to address a broader, national audience. Overall, based on the points
highlighted in my analysis, the current polarized domestic political climate and the
ever-increasing globalized context of the U.S. presidency will increase the need for political
science scholars to further study the use of foreign policy rhetoric during the presidential
campaigning process and what that possible recent phenomenon entails for how presidential
candidates will have to reconceptualize their presidential campaign strategies.
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